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Abstract: 
Only recently, competition authorities tend to agree on comparative advertising 
being helpful in promoting competition. They now encourage firms to use it. They 
reason that comparative advertising, if fair and not misleading, increases 
consumers’ information about alternative brands. For this to work, comparative 
claims must be credible. Competition policy and legal practice are essential in 
making comparative advertising (directly and indirectly) informative.  
 In this paper, first we provide a legal background of comparative 
advertising in in Europe and the US. Second, we provide an economic analysis of 
comparative advertising. Here, we discuss the ways comparative advertising can 
affect market outcomes. Third, we provide an analysis of some recent legal cases 
in Europe and the US. Overall, we focus on the scope of information transmission 
through comparative advertising and on the way antitrust laws affect it. 
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1. Introduction 
Until very recently several continental European countries completely had banned any 
form of comparative advertising whereas, in the US, the use of comparative advertising 
has actually been encouraged by the Federal Trade Commission since the 1970’s. While 
in the past the European and American approach towards this type of advertising was 
markedly different, today competition authorities agree in considering comparative 
advertising an important tool in promoting competition, such that firms and retailers are 
stimulated to use comparative ads. The reason is that comparative advertising, if fair 
and not misleading, is claimed to increase consumers’ information about alternative 
brands, products and services and to positively affect competition among (domestic and 
cross-border) firms. In particular, the argument goes that direct comparison ads would 
encourage consumers to make more informed purchasing decisions - moreover, 
comparison ads would ease the consumer's task of evaluating the performance of 
particular brands against other brands. 
 
A particular understanding of this idea is the following (we elaborate on this in section 
3). With respect to generic advertising, comparative claims provide information which 
is easily converted in operational knowledge by consumers. Often, content-based 
advertising which does not make comparisons is of little meaning to consumers. When 
this is the case, the consumers’ ability in processing comparative ads should be higher 
because comparative claims refer to experimented aspects of past consumption or serve 
as a reference point. 
 
For information transmission to work, consumers must not be deceived. Here, laws and 
legal practice are essential to facilitate that comparative advertising claims are truthful. 
In particular, competition policy must be designed such that the consumers’ and the 
competitors’ interest in truthful information transmission can be assured.  
 
This paper analyzes the regulation of comparative advertising by competition policy 
and, in particular, focuses on how such regulation affects the signaling role and the role 
for competition of comparative ads. We address a set of questions: What is the legal 
history of comparative advertising? What is the current legislation with respect to 
comparative advertising in the US and Europe? How does comparative advertising 
affect market outcomes? In particular, what is the scope of information transmission of 
comparative advertising and how is it affected by competition policy? And finally, what 
should be kept in mind when designing competition policy? 
Before answering these questions, we provide definitions of comparative advertising 
and document its importance as a marketing practice. 
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Definition of comparative advertising 
According to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in the US, “Comparative 
advertising is defined as advertising that compares alternative brands on objectively 
measurable attributes or price, and identifies the alternative brand by name, illustration 
or other distinctive information” (Statement of Policy Regarding Comparative 
Advertising, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C., August 13, 1979). 
In the European Union, enactment of directive 97/55/EC concerning misleading and 
comparative advertising reads: “comparative advertising means any advertising which 
explicitly or by implication identifies a competitor or goods or services offered by a 
competitor”.1 
 
Comparative advertising can be classified according to whether it is direct or indirect. 
In direct comparative ads the competing products either are explicitly named or can be 
precisely identified (by photos, images or trademarks). We give two examples. In 1991 
MasterCard launched a “campaign that used funny 30-second commercials to depict 
frenzied American Express Card holders rushing madly around unsuccessfully trying to 
find an ATM that would take their card” (Leighton 2004). A 1999 General Motors 
Corp. ad claimed that the Cadillac Seville STS outperforms BMW 540 in a slalom race. 
By contrast, indirect comparative ads do not directly refer to competing brand names. 
The Avis “We try harder” campaign launched in the US in 1962 is perhaps the most 
famous example.2 
 
Diffusion of comparative advertising 
Comparative advertising is considered a quite aggressive marketing practice. Sectors 
most affected by rules on comparative advertising include food, retail, motoring and 
airlines. Famous examples of direct comparative ads involve Coke and Pepsi, Burger 
King and McDonald's, Unilever and Procter and Gamble (see David Teather in 
Marketing; London; May 11, 2000). 
  
Different studies suggest varying figures on the relative use of comparative advertising 
in the US. Muehling et al. (1990) find that around 40 percent of all advertising is 
comparative. Pechmann and Steward (1990) find on a different data set that 60 percent 
of all ads are indirectly comparative, 20 percent  contain direct comparative claims; the 
rest are non-comparative. In general, comparative advertising is seen as an important 
option within the different possibilities of advertising. 
 
                                                          
1 In the real world we can observe advertising campaigns where the sponsoring brand simply declare the 
merits of its product with respect to the competitors' one, and others ads explicitly degrading the 
competing brands. 
2 “In 1962 Hertz was the clear leader in the car rental business, with Avis as one of the brands in the 
following pack. The Avis 'We try harder' campaign repositioned Hertz creating a relative, believable and 
compelling strength for Avis. The market dominance of Hertz became a weakness and Avis became the 
'right choice' in the mind of consumers.“ From BuildingBrands on the website 
http://www.buildingbrands.com. The campaign can be seen as the first “modern” use of comparative ad in 
advertising history (see Bixby and Lincoln, 1989, and references therein). 
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In most European Union countries comparative advertising is a quite young 
phenomenon, as we will see in the next section. We are not aware of any systematic 
study about its diffusion. Probably the lack of harmonization of comparative advertising 
rules among the European Countries, despite the Directive 97/55/EC, and the 
subsequent legal risks faced by the advertising firms still represents an obstacle for its 
diffusion.3 Also, since consumers have been less exposed to comparative advertising, 
advertisers may be more critical of its effectiveness in Europe. 
 
The lack of harmonization within Europe and across different countries more generally 
is even more relevant today because of the increasing commerce on the internet. With 
on-line product searching and distance selling comparative advertising has received 
renewed attention. The explosive growth of Internet advertising forces practitioners to 
verify whether their ads comply with international comparative advertising standards 
and social norms. In the words of Freeman and Nemiroff (2001), “… if you decide to 
use comparative advertisements as a marketing tool in a foreign country, or even if your 
online ad results in sales to foreign consumers, it is important to first obtain a complete 
legal assessment of that country’s advertising laws.”4 
 
Comparative ads from the marketing literature perspective 
Apart from legal risks, a number of advertisers have been reluctant to use comparative 
because some long-term consequences of comparison advertising may be seriously 
detrimental to the advertising firm. A first potentially negative effect of comparison 
advertising is the misidentification of sponsoring brands: comparison ads might increase 
the salience of competing brand without improving consumer awareness of the brand 
sponsoring the message. A second important possible negative impact of comparison 
advertising concerns credibility: an ad for one brand might not be viewed by consumers 
as a highly credible source of information about competing brands because of a logical 
likelihood of manipulative intent (see Wilkie and Farris, 1975). 
 
In the marketing literature on comparison ads the general effectiveness of comparative 
advertising is still controversial (see Prasad 1976, Pechmann and Ratneshwar 1991, Jain 
et al. 1998, Barone and Miniard 1999). Nevertheless, a general agreement exists 
concerning the fact that a low-share or unfamiliar brand (the underdog) can enhance the 
relevance of an ad by naming a leading brand that consumers regularly purchase. In 
other words comparison ads should be more effective in stimulating initial attention 
towards small firms wishing to take on established brands (e.g. Muehling et al. 1990, 
Pechmann and Stewart 1990). For example, citing the words of the dealer marketing 
manager at Mitsubishi, the company used comparative advertising when entering the 
                                                          
3 Such a harmonization is defended on the ground that the differences in the treatment of comparative 
advertising among member states is an impediment to the free flow of goods and communications within 
the EU (see Petty and Spink, 1995). 
4 A legal issue related to Internet comparative advertising is that of jurisdiction. Since the Internet is 
accessible from most countries, a comparative ad that is legal in the country where the ad originates may 
be viewed by consumers in a country that restricts such advertising practice (see also Berns Wright and 
Morgan, 2002). 
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European market, "to guide the consumer by making associations with top brand 
names" (Director; London; June, 2000; Alison Coleman). This is the so called 
“underdog hypothesis”, for an exposition from the marketing perspective we refer to 
Gnepa (1993). 
 
Plan of the paper 
In section 2 we explore the legal background. We provide answers to the first two 
questions posed above, namely we elaborate on the legal history of comparative 
advertising and the current legislation with respect to comparative ads in the US and 
Europe. In section 3 we explore some economic perspectives on comparative 
advertising. We provide answers to the third and fourth question, namely we analyze 
how comparative advertising may affect market outcomes. In particular, we elaborate 
on the scope of information transmission of comparative advertising and on how it is 
influenced by competition policy. In section 4 we present a number of legal cases. They 
suggest additional considerations with respect to the above questions. They also 
provides a partial answer on the fifth question, namely on what should be kept in mind 
when designing competition policy with respect to comparative advertising. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Legal Background 
 
Comparative advertising in the US 
In the US, federal advertising legislation is found in two major laws: the Federal Trade 
Commission Act and the Trademark (Lanham) Act (the federal trademark statute 
prohibiting false designations of origin and false or misleading descriptions of facts). 
The Federal Trade Commission, when it was founded in 1914, had as its mission to 
protect businesses against unfair practices. In 1922 the Supreme Court ruled that the 
FTC has the right to regulate advertising. Specifically, this ruling allowed the FTC to 
regulate all aspects of false labelling and unfair methods of competition in advertising. 
Comparative advertising became an important issue in the 1960’s and 1970’s. Early on 
the FTC has emphasized that comparative advertising is a means to transmit 
information to consumers. In 1963 the FTC narrowed an order with respect to 
comparative advertising so as to allow firms to make “truthful and non-deceptive 
statements that a product has certain desirable properties or qualities which a competing 
product or products do not possess. Such a comparison may have the effect of 
disparaging the competing product, but we know of no rule of law which prevents a 
seller from honestly informing the public of the advantages of its products as opposed to 
those of competing products.” (60 F.T.C. at 796) 
 
The relatively sudden increase, during the 1970s and 1980’s, in the use of explicit 
comparisons in advertising in the US, was in part a result of a Federal Trade 
Commission appraisal of such a practice as a means of improving competition. The 
FTC statement reads: “The Commission has supported the use of brand comparisons 
where the bases of comparison are clearly identified. Comparative advertising, when 
truthful and non-deceptive, is a source of important information to consumers and 
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assists them in making rational purchase decisions. Comparative advertising encourages 
product improvement and innovation, and can lead to lower prices in the marketplace.” 
(Statement of Policy Regarding Comparative Advertising, Federal Trade Commission, 
Washington, D.C., August 13, 1979) 
 
Both competitors and consumers can address to the FTC for controversies arising from 
comparative advertising. Nevertheless most complaints about comparative advertising 
actions have not come from consumers, but instead from the firms which were the target 
of the comparison. Since 1974, plaintiffs, instead of addressing to the FTC, started 
ordinary Court actions applying to the 1946 Lanham Act.5 These firms have found that 
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act (although it does not mention advertising) holds in the 
words of Bixby and Lincoln (1989, page 145) “the key to getting more expedient and 
decisive action taken on their complaints. […] Section 43(a) of Lanham Act was largely 
intended to clarify trademark, “palming off”, and other trade law issues. However, it has 
been used as a basis for private litigation against companies promulgating allegedly 
false comparative advertising.” 
 
The amended Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act says that “any person who, on or in 
connection with any goods or services … uses in commerce any word, term, name, 
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false 
or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which ... 
in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, 
qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or 
commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he 
or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.” Plaintiffs typically have used section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act rather than the FTC Act “because (1) it may give them 
immediate relief from competitive advertising by means of an injunction, (2) it may 
oblige the competitor to run corrective advertising, and (3) it may allow the plaintiff to 
collect damages from the defendant.” (Bixby and Lincoln, 1989, page 145). 
 
Legal practice: standards of substantiation 
An important issue is whether the standards of substantiation are to be higher using 
comparative advertising compared to other forms of advertising which makes claims 
about product characteristics. The position of the FTC, as stated in 1979, reads: “On 
occasion, a higher standard of substantiation by advertisers using comparative 
advertising has been required by self-regulation entities. The Commission evaluates 
comparative advertising in the same manner as it evaluates all other advertising 
techniques. The ultimate question is whether or not the advertising has a tendency or 
capacity to be false or deceptive. This is a factual issue to be determined on a case-by-
case basis. However, industry codes and interpretations that impose a higher standard of 
substantiation for comparative claims than for unilateral claims are inappropriate and 
                                                          
5 Leigton (2004, p. 585),  reads: “It took Congress over 30 years to catch up with the courts. The 
Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 amended Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act to ratify the robust false 
advertising cause of action that has been developed judicially”. 
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should be revised.” (Statement of Policy Regarding Comparative Advertising, Federal 
Trade Commission, Washington, D.C., August 13, 1979) 
 
We like to make two important caveats here. (i) Since competitors can take actions 
against comparative claims and much less so against claims that are not comparative, 
the FTC statement of non-discrimination may not correspond to legal practice. (ii) The 
FTC statement becomes empty, if comparative advertising is the only means to 
communicate content about a product to consumers. This is the case if a competitor’s 
product serves as a reference point for consumers because consumers do not have an 
understanding for absolute content statements. 
 
“To state a cause of action for misleading advertisement under the Lanham Act, a 
plaintiff must establish the following: 1) the defendant has made false or misleading 
statements of fact concerning his own product or another’s; 2) the statement actually or 
tends to deceive a substantial portion of the intended audience; 3) the statement is 
material in that it will likely influence the deceived consumer’s purchasing decisions; 4) 
the advertisements were introduced into interstate commerce; and 5) there is some 
causal link between the challenged statements and harm to the plaintiff.” (Leighton 
2004, page 588). 
 
“When materiality has to be proven under the Lanham Act, it usually must be shown 
that the claim at issue likely would affect purchase decisions of a significant percentage 
of the intended audience.” (Leighton, 2004). The plaintiff must provide clear results 
from consumers’ surveys about how consumers interpret the claim and subsequently 
exert purchasing choices. Notice that even if the claim is not literally false it is 
actionable if it provides consumers with a wrong perception of reality. In other words 
the content of an ad is important (it must be true) but also the general impression given 
to consumers matters. In particular, what matters is the way consumers interpret the ad. 
To summarize, two situations are possible. An ad may have a literally false statement 
but not be deceptive or misleading in its net impression. Or every claim in an ad may be 
literally true, but the net impression given by the ad can be misleading. As Wood (2003) 
reports: “most cases involve advertising that contains literally true statements when 
viewed out of context but, as presented, leaves a false or deceptive net impression.” 
 
More specifically, courts place false or misleading advertising into three categories: 
implied falsity, literal falsity and mere puffery. Only the first two categories are 
actionable. “Most plaintiffs prefer the court to categorize the challenged advertising as 
literally false because the element of deception is presumed and no costly consumer 
survey is required” (McKenna and Manning 2002, p. 2).6 
 
The third category is not actionable. Puffery can be used as a defense in Lanham Act 
false advertising cases. When such a defense succeeds, the court finding is that the 
claim in the ad is merely the seller’s opinion and therefore non-actionable puffery.  The 
courts and regulatory agencies find an advertising claim to be mere puffery when it 
                                                          
6 See also Pizza Hut v. Papa John’s, as discussed in section 4. 
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obviously is not material to reasonable potential customers. In other words the claim 
clearly reports the seller’s opinion and “no sensible man takes seriously”. We can 
distinguish between “puffery by exaggeration, bluster, boast or humor” (the MasterCard 
advertising mentioned in the introduction falls in such a category). And “puffery by 
vagueness and/or seller’s opinion” as the ad “the most beautiful car on the market” (see 
Leighton 2004). However, the world of puffery is quite small for comparative ads, as 
Pizza Hut v. Papa John’s exemplifies (although the federal court’s decision was 
overturned). This case is discussed in section 4.  
 
Also, comparative ads which may be defended as puffery may be ruled to violate 
trademark anti-dilution law. Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act contains the important 
norm concerning Trademark Dilution, i.e., disparagement, blurring or alteration of a 
competitor's “famous” trademark. It aims at preventing the reduction of a trademark's 
selling power. If a firm is the target of a comparison ad, it can base its lawsuit on 
Section 43(c) whenever the advertising campaign alters or distorts its trademark in any 
way that could be regarded as spoofing the mark. More than twenty States in the US 
have anti-dilution laws which sometimes are stricter than the corresponding federal law 
(as the New York's trademark anti-dilution statute). Recently, in the case Deere & 
Company v. MTD Products, Inc., the court dismissed the allegation based on the Section 
42(a) of the Lanham Act and found that the comparative statements were true. Anyway, 
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit of New York affirmed a lower court's 
injunction barring the comparative advertising because it violated New York's 
trademark anti-dilution statute.7 One law firm argues that other States would now look 
to New York' Court of Appeals as persuasive authority and follow its interpretation of 
what constitutes "dilution" (see Wood, 2004). 
 
Legal practice: damages 
Section 35 of the Lanham Act allows plaintiffs to claim a number of damages: lost 
profits, corrective advertising expenses to help regain loss business, attorneys’ fees, and 
punitive damages. Standards of proof for recovering damages for false advertising are 
high. In fact, to be entitled to damages, a plaintiff must show that consumers were 
actually deceived by the defendant's false advertising and that there was a direct cause 
or connection between the alleged false advertising and the injury of the plaintiff. 
“However, in several cases, the courts have dispensed with the requirement that actual 
deception be proven where the defendant's conduct was found to be wilful” (Raymond, 
2004). Thus, when misrepresentations in the ad are wilful and egregious, actual 
deception is presumed and even punitive damages can be awarded. Anyway, damage 
awards have not been common in Lanham Act cases. On the contrary, only a dozen of 
court decisions provided for damages awards in false advertising cases and only some 
of them refer to comparative ad. The most important case, with a 40 Mio $ reward, is U-
                                                          
7 The comparative advertising commercial for Yardman, MTD's lawn tractor used an altered animation of 
Deere's well-known trademark logo: a “leaping deer”. In the comparative television commercials, a 
smaller, blurred version of this deer was depicted running across the screen in fear of an MTD tractor. 
However, if MTD had used the image correctly, Deere Co. would have had no basis for a lawsuit.  
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Haul International Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d 1034 (9th Cir. 1986). We will shortly 
discuss this case in section 4. 
 
The law firm Arnold and Porter suggests that damages are so rare because of the 
perceived difficulty of proof.8 Other authors argue that the courts are sceptical towards 
comparative claims in litigations concerning trade mark infringement or malicious 
falsehood. In particular Swan (2000, page 4) reads: “judges take the view that the public 
is neither gullible nor particularly trustful of advertising. Even if a cause of action is 
established, judges take some convincing that a comparative advertisement has caused 
any damage”. 
 
Comparative advertising in the EU 
Until very recently, comparative advertising was essentially not allowed in European 
countries. The explicit identification of competitors had been banned in Belgium, Italy 
and Luxemburg. It was generally prohibited as unfair competition in Germany and 
France, unless advance notification was given to the competitor. Limited comparative 
advertising was permitted in Spain and the Netherlands.9 The use was restricted by the 
criteria of strict truthfulness and relevance in Scandinavia (see e.g. J. Dickerson and P. 
Jordan from the DLA Group in the UK, www.dla.com). In particular “the explicit 
identification of a rival or its product constituted unauthorized use of the rival's 
trademark or unfair denigration” (Petty and Spink, 1995). Recently, the UK had, 
compared with other Member States, a reputation of taking a rather relaxed approach 
(see below). 
 
The European Union first addressed the issue of comparative advertising in the late 
1970s. The position was that comparative advertising should be legal if it provides 
verifiable details and is neither misleading nor unfair. However, laws on comparative 
advertising were harmonized only in April 2000 (almost 20 years after its first 
proposal). “The preamble of the directive indicates that for goods to flow freely 
throughout the EC, the rules governing the form and content of advertising must be 
uniform and notes that this currently is not the case with comparative advertising. The 
preamble emphasizes comparative advertising's importance as a consumer decision-
making tool and a stimulus of competition.” (Petty and Spink, 1995) 
 
According to current European legislation comparative advertising is allowed only if it 
is not misleading, compares like with like, does not create confusion, discredit or take 
unfair advantage of a rival's trademark or present goods as imitations of those bearing a 
                                                          
8 They also suggest that this may be due to out-of-court settlements after the grant or denial of a 
preliminary injunction. See the newsletter Consumer Product Marketing, 2002(2) by Arnold and Porter. 
9 For example, the Netherlands Supreme Court condemned a comparative advertisement that promoted 
one brand fertilizer claiming that lower amounts are needed than with a competing brand. The Court 
admitted the general possibility of individual brand comparisons. However, it condemned the particular 
advertisement on the ground that it did not disclose the difference in composition between the two 
products (see Petty and Spink, 1995, and references). 
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protected trade name. To be more precise, it is state in article 3a of the Directive 
97/55/EC of European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 1997 that  
Comparative advertising shall, as far as the comparison is concerned, be 
permitted when the following conditions are met: 
(a) it is not misleading …;  
(b) it compares goods or services meeting the same needs or intended for the 
same purpose;  
(c) it objectively compares one or more material, relevant, verifiable and 
representative features of those goods and services, which may include price;  
(d) it does not create confusion in the market place between the advertiser and a 
competitor or between the advertiser's trade marks, trade names, other 
distinguishing marks, goods or services and those of a competitor;  
(e) it does not discredit or denigrate the trade marks, trade names, other 
distinguishing marks, goods, services, activities, or circumstances of a 
competitor;  
(f) for products with designation of origin, it relates in each case to products 
with the same designation;  
(g) it does not take unfair advantage of the reputation of a trade mark, trade 
name or other distinguishing marks of a competitor or of the designation of 
origin of competing products10;  
(h) it does not present goods or services as imitations or replicas of goods or 
services bearing a protected trade mark or trade name. 
 
Several of the restrictions on comparative advertising can be defended by common-
sense, although they are open for interpretation, as we illustrate in Section 4. However, 
a defense of condition (f) is less clear as it requires comparisons to products with the 
same designation. In particular, this effectively reduces the possibility of imports to 
establish themselves against certain home-grown products. 
 
The authority responding to controversies arising from comparative advertising is the 
competition authority in every member state. However, the directive provides for the 
possibility of ordinary Court actions when comparative advertising consists in acts 
amounting to unfair competition, or infringes the laws on copyright, trademarks or other 
distinguishing signs. In particular, not only the competitor but also consumers and their 
organizations and associations can directly apply to a court. 
 
In Section 7 (administrative and judicial remedies) of the Directive 97/55/EC it is 
written that (i) the ad deemed to be unlawful can be provisionally suspended by the 
Authority; (ii) the advertiser can be asked to furnish evidence as to the accuracy of 
factual claims in the ad, if evidence is not given or is deemed inadequate, the factual 
data shall be considered false; (iii) when the Court rules in favor of the plaintiff, the 
misleading ad must be stopped and eventually the Court’s judgment published, 
moreover, the advertiser can be asked to publish a corrective ad. 
 
                                                          
10 Notice that point (g) is particularly relevant for the “underdog case”. 
 11
As Petty and Spink (1995, page 317) observe, “the tenor and language of the European 
(proposal) directive contrast sharply with the permissiveness of U.S. policy toward 
comparative advertising. Although legal violations, such as trademark infringement, 
disparagement, and passing off, are recognized in both the United States and Europe, 
they are more broadly construed in Europe.” Moreover, they claim that “in many cases, 
comparisons allowed in the United States will be prohibited in Europe.” 
 
As we mentioned before, within the EU the UK has today a rather relaxed attitude 
towards comparative advertising. Nevertheless, to compare the legal approaches to 
comparative advertising characterizing European countries and the US it is useful to 
consider the UK as an example for an EU country. In both countries the interpretation 
by the courts is of particular importance because both, the UK and the US, have a 
common law legal system, where court cases provide precedent, i.e. these cases are used 
by other courts within the same jurisdiction when making decisions in comparable 
cases. 
 
Particular country study: UK 
Before 1994 comparative advertising were prohibited in the UK because it amounted to 
trade mark infringement. Then, section 10(6) of the Trade Mark Act (TMA) permitted 
the use of another trademark for purpose of making a comparison within certain 
guidelines. As Berns Wright and Morgan (2002, page 14) put it: “the TMA provides 
that trademarks must not be used other than in accordance with honest practice. The 
courts’ test for honesty is an objective one. They ask: would a reasonable reader, 
accustomed to advertisings’ use of hyperbole and even “knocking copy”11, find the 
advertisement so biased or misleading to be dishonest? The comparison must be 
between products intended to meet the same needs or intended for the same purpose. 
The comparison must be material, relevant, representative, and verifiable.” Moreover, 
comparative advertising must not create confusion, nor creating the impression of a link 
between different trademarks. In the cases of alleged trademark infringement, the 
plaintiff, who is the trademark owner, has to prove that the use of the trademark is not 
honest.12  
 
Some years later the TMA approval, the European Directive on comparative advertising 
was implemented in the UK with the Control of Misleading Advertising (Amendment) 
Regulations 2000. As Dickerson and Jordan (2003) observe, the harmonization 
initiative did not mean for the UK a relaxation of the law on comparative advertising, 
contrary to what happened in the other Member States. 
  
Given that the use of comparative advertising has been introduced so recently, UK 
courts are still determining the way comparative advertising laws are being put in 
                                                          
11 The practice of favorable comparing one product whilst denigrating its competitor. 
12 Notice that, under the TMA, the plaintiff must prove that the use of its trademark by the advertiser is 
not honest, while, under the Directive, the advertiser must furnish evidence as to the accuracy of factual 
claims in the ad. 
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practice. Several cases in the recent past suggest a general encouragement to the use of 
comparative advertising, as we will discuss in section 4. 
 
Berns Wright and Morgan (2002) compare the European Directive and the UK 
Trademark Law on one side with the FTC’s statements and the Lanham Trademark Law 
on the other side. Some interesting points arise. In the FTC’s law the focus of protection 
is only on consumers and competitors, while in the Directive it includes the general 
public as well. The comparative claim must compare “like with like” in UK, while the 
comparison of dissimilar product is permitted in the US. Moreover, objective claims are 
required in the UK while subjective claims are permitted in the US. Testing in a lawsuit 
must be ran by independent third party in UK, whereas standards are not set in the US. 
The burden of the proof as to the accuracy of factual claims in the ad is given to the 
advertisers in the UK, while it is given to the competitor challenging the claim in the 
US.13 Malicious intent must be proved in the UK for an ad to be actionable, this is in 
line with the “honest practice” the Court asks for, according to the TMA. 
 
As a consequence, the comparison between the UK’s and the US’s attitude on 
comparison ad suggests for advertisers that since “[t]he American approach of 
aggressive, vague, opinionated comparisons is not likely to meet the standards under the 
European Directive, US advertisers should begin to utilize a more benign approach to 
comparative communications if they desire to present the same campaigns in EU 
Member States.” (Berns Wright and Morgan, 2002, p. 22) 14 
 
As the analysis of some cases in section 4 will reveal, we are still far from a true 
harmonization of the way Directive 97/55/EC has been received by the different 
Member States. Given the different histories with respect to the legality of comparative 
advertising and different attitudes among member states, this is hardly surprising.15 
 
Particular industry study: professional services in EU 
It is interesting to note that the use of advertising in the market for professional services 
has traditionally been illegal in all industrialized countries. Today, where it is allowed, 
                                                          
13 The fact that the burden of the proof is given to the advertiser makes European advertising firms less 
likely and/or more cautious in using comparative advertising with respect to the American ones. This 
aspect is important in the economic analysis of comparative advertising as a signal of product quality, as 
we will show in the next section. 
14 Quite different regulatory regimes have also been adopted with respect to Internet advertising. In the 
US a comprehensive regulatory program is missing. Hence, the control is essentially left to the industries’ 
self-regulation. In Europe competition policy sees the need to protect consumers from “aggressive 
business practice, while building trust and confidence in Internet information sources” (Berns Wright and 
Morgan, 2002, p. 23). 
15 “It appears clear that, even if some useful general principles and criteria on comparative advertising 
have been achieved, many aspects
 
are still assigned to the competence of national courts for case-by-case 
evaluation. No doubt that in the next future significant differences and contrasting solutions are likely to 
be found in the handling of similar or identical cases by domestic courts. The harmonizing process, which 
inspired the EU Directive on comparative advertising, will therefore require a substantial amount of case 
law – and for sure, additional interpretation by the European Court of Justice – before a satisfying level of 
uniformed criteria will result available.” (Hofer, 2003) 
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usually advertising is legal as long as it is not comparative (see, for example, 
advertising regulation for lawyers in Sweden and in the US or the for accountants in 
Italy).16 However, it can be argued that such an advertising regulation for professional 
services seriously affects competition and is detrimental for consumers. The preamble 
of the Commission Communication of 9 February 2004 entitled “Report on competition 
in Professional Services” explicitly asks to regulatory authorities in the Member States 
and professional bodies to review the rules governing professional services because 
these rules are not necessary for the public interest and, thus, are unjustified. Moreover, 
the Commission suggests to put in place pro-competitive and transparency-enhancing 
mechanisms to strengthen consumer empowerment.17 
 
Analyzing the markets in which lawyers, notaries, accountants, architects, engineers and 
pharmacists operate in the European Union, the Commission has identified five main 
categories of national legislation or self-regulation that restrict competition: fixed 
prices, recommended prices, advertising restrictions, entry restrictions and reserved 
tasks and regulations governing business structure and multidisciplinary practices. The 
Commission believes that advertising, and in particular comparative advertising, can be 
a crucial competitive tool for new firms entering the market and for existing firms to 
launch new products. 
 
It is interesting to notice that advertising restrictions are justified by professional bodies 
on the ground of the asymmetry of information between practitioners and consumers of 
professional services. According to this argument, consumers find it difficult to assess 
information about professional services and therefore need particular protection from 
misleading or manipulative claims. Against such a rationale for advertising bans the 
Commission mentions the increasing body of empirical evidence which highlights the 
potentially negative effects of some advertising restrictions (see Stephen and Love 
2000). This research suggests that advertising restrictions may under certain 
circumstances increase the fees for professional services without having a positive 
effect on the quality of those services. As the Commission argues, the implication of 
these findings is that advertising restrictions do not necessarily provide an appropriate 
response to asymmetry of information in professional services. Conversely, truthful and 
objective advertising may actually help consumers to overcome the asymmetry and to 
make more informed purchasing decisions (we return to this point in section 3). 
 
                                                          
16 “A large number of the EU professions are subject to sector-specific advertising regulation. In some 
cases (e.g. in France for notaries), advertising of any kind is prohibited. In others, specific media or 
advertising methods such as radio advertising, television advertising, "cold calling" or specific types of 
advertising content are prohibited. In certain cases, there is a lack of clarity in existing advertising 
regulations which, in itself, may deter professionals from employing certain advertising methods” (from 
the Commission Communication of 9 February 2004 entitled “Report on competition in Professional 
Services”, page 14) 
17 From an enforcement perspective, since May 2004 the national competition authorities and the national 
courts have a more prominent role in assessing the legality of rules and regulations in the professions. 
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The Commission reports that during the last two decades a number of member states 
have started to relax advertising restrictions in the professions.18 This general practice 
together with the market outcomes it has led to, suggests that sector specific advertising 
restrictions in these professions may not be essential for protecting consumers from 
misleading claims. As a result, today the legal, notary and pharmacy professions are 
able to conduct most forms of advertising in a number of Member States. Obviously all 
professions remain subject to general legislation that prevents untruthful or deceptive 
advertising. 
 
 
3. Economic Perspectives on Comparative Advertising 
 
It is useful to distinguish between different types of advertising: persuasive advertising, 
advertising as a complement, directly informative advertising, and indirectly 
informative advertising (see also Bagwell, 2003). Comparative advertising may be of 
any of these types. 
 
Under persuasive advertising, advertising changes the preferences of consumers. This is 
the classic view of advertising and may also apply to comparative advertising. In the 
case of comparative advertising it may do so in two ways, it may increase the 
willingness-to-pay for the sponsoring brand and it may reduce the willingness-to-pay 
for the compared brand. Comparative advertising may also be seen as a complement if 
consumers derive benefits from consuming the advertising together with the product of 
the sponsoring brand. Also, when the comparative advertising is consumed together 
with the negatively compared good, it may decrease the utility that consumers of the 
competitor’s product get from such a product. As shown in the case of non-comparative 
advertising, it is a matter of interpretation whether advertising is to be seen as 
persuasive or as a complement because market outcomes are the same (see Bagwell, 
2003). However, welfare results may differ. 
 
Concerning informative advertising, some specifications are useful. In the real world we 
observe both advertising messages which are content-based and whose words transmit 
information to consumers about the sponsoring product, and ads which, on the contrary 
are content-free. We consider content-based ads as potentially directly informative. In 
the case of content-free ads, the “words” of the advertising claim (if any) provide no 
information to consumers. The standard assumption is that consumers can infer the cost 
of the ad. The term “dissipative advertising” indicates that it is just the cost of the ad, 
instead of its content, which is able to transmit some information to consumers. The 
firm burns money in the advertising campaign and this is publicly observable; the 
                                                          
18 “In the 1970s, for example, advertising restrictions were removed for the legal and accountancy 
professions in the United Kingdom. In the 1990s, restrictive advertising rules were removed for the legal, 
accountancy and architectural professions in Denmark. In the last few years, strict advertising bans have 
also been relaxed for the professions in Germany. The accountancy and technical professions now 
function effectively without the need for any significant sector-specific advertising restrictions in a large 
number of Member States.” (again from COM2004 83 final, page 14) 
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consequence is that advertising expenses can act as a signal for consumers (Nelson, 
1976).19 In this sense, content-free ads can be indirectly informative. Under such 
indirectly informative advertising, the sponsoring firm does not necessarily give truthful 
information. By the amount of the advertising expenditure the firm may be able to 
convince consumers that its claims are truthful.  
 
Comparative advertising can be considered content-based because it makes a 
comparison or a “superiority claim”. In fact, implicitly or explicitly, in every 
comparative ad either the message “my product is better than …” or “my product is as 
good as …” is contained. Thus, a comparison ad is always potentially directly 
informative. The comparisons often serve as benchmarking to help consumers placing 
the product in the right category and focusing on its salient aspects. In fact, e.g. in the 
case of food advertising, absolute statements on nutrition often are of little information 
to consumers. As we will see in this section, comparative advertising can also transmit 
some information indirectly. First, the cost of the advertising campaign, as in the case of 
generic content-free ads, can indirectly transmit some information to consumers. What 
seems to be really relevant in the case of comparative ads is a second channel to 
indirectly convey information which operates through the competitor’s reaction that a 
comparative ad potentially induces. Note that in general all advertising claims can be 
challenged. However, as outlined above for puffery, certain comparative ads are more 
likely to be challenged than corresponding non-comparative ads.20 We will focus on this 
aspect later on in this section. 
 
The superiority claim always contained in the comparative ad can go together with other 
direct information. This is the case of pricing comparative advertising where 
information about a verifiable characteristic of the product (and of the competitor’s one) 
as the price, is given. Even when the information contained in the comparative ad is 
verifiable, legal disputes are frequent. Litigations often concern the way facts are 
presented in the claim and/or perceived by consumers, sometimes the facts themselves. 
The high number of legal issues proves that the second channel of indirect information, 
that is the competitor’s reaction to the comparison ad, is important also in comparative 
ad with verifiable information. Nevertheless, a large part of comparative advertising, at 
least in the US, apart the (implicit) superiority claim, do not provide other direct 
information. Or, in other words, the statement in the ad is so vague, general and not 
                                                          
19 Nelson’s well known explanation of advertising as a rational phenomenon is based on the idea that its 
explicitly high cost works as a device to signal high quality of a brand. The signaling motive filled a gap 
in the understanding of a controversial economic phenomenon, namely the apparently wasteful 
advertising campaigns. The argument, intended to apply to generic advertising, implies that the cost, and 
not the content, of an ad is what really matters. 
20 This point is well taken by practitioners. Several advertising agency publish sentences on their web 
sites such as “Comparative advertising can be a very effective tool, but with it comes the risk of 
challenges by competitors, state attorneys general, and even the FTC”. Or: “Comparative advertising 
campaigns present greater risks - and can lead to greater rewards in the form of customers response - than 
traditional monadic campaigns. You should assume that any campaign you run will be seen by your 
competitors’ upper management, who will decide whether or not to challenge the ad”. (Freeman and 
Nemiroff, 2001). 
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verifiable, that the message conveyed by the ad only depends on the way consumers 
interpret it. Here, in the case the competitor named in the comparison ad goes to court, 
uncertainty concerning the court’s judgment is really high. The litigation outcome 
substantially depends on the attitude towards comparative advertising which 
characterizes the court and the country where the dispute is ran. 
 
Below we discuss comparative price advertising, persuasive advertising and informative 
advertising in more detail. 
 
Comparative Price Advertising 
Perhaps the most obvious case of comparative advertising is comparative price 
advertising. Competition authorities had in particular this type of advertising in mind 
when they started encouraging the use of comparative advertising. In fact, claims about 
price are easily verifiable, perhaps they represent the simplest type of direct 
information, as holds more generally for search good attributes. For this reason, in the 
case of comparative price advertising, not only competitors named in the ad file 
complaints against it, also many consumers who feel mislead react (e.g. in the Report 
from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Consumer 
Complaints in Respect of Distance Selling and Comparative Advertising it is written: 
“Complaints from competitors refer to comparative advertising considered misleading 
and/or unfair. The complaints relate to comparisons based on price or price-levels. 
Complaints regarding comparisons in terms of quality are rarer, however.” 
(COM(2000)127final). 
 
Note that in its pure form comparative price advertising  means that consumers are 
aware before the advertising is placed that products are the same (or comparable) and 
that they only lack price information. In this case, a comparison ad allows consumers to 
avoid costly search or if they were not going to search, to purchase the good at a lower 
price in expected terms. More price information is generally thought to intensify 
competition, which further reduces the expected price consumers pay. However, often 
the price comparison comes with a low-price guarantee. As is well-known in the 
literature on price-matching policies, such policies can lead to collusive outcomes, 
which is clearly detrimental to consumer welfare and, typically, also total welfare (e.g. 
Doyle, 1988, Logan and Lutter, 1989). Thus it is important to separate the issue of 
comparative price advertising from commitments to offer low prices. In the former case, 
the use of comparative advertising is likely to result in lower prices and less market 
power by firms. This is increases welfare. In the latter case, firms may effectively 
collude in prices. This reduces welfare. Related, if a firm acquires the reputation to use 
comparative price advertising together with undercutting against new rivals, any 
potential rival may want to stay outside the market. 
 
Notice that, when comparative price advertising is performed on the Internet, the 
comparative claims should be easily verifiable by consumers who search a product at 
the lowest cost on the web. Thus, as a consequence of Bertrand competition, we should 
expect pricing at the marginal cost to be frequently reached for homogenous products. A 
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recent empirical literature on E-commerce and Internet price strategies show that this is 
not necessarily true. In fact, firms frequently adopt obfuscation strategies and, as a 
result, price heterogeneity for homogenous goods is the general outcome. It is argued 
that a crucial role is exerted by shop-boots who have interest in maintaining such a price 
dispersion on the web (see e.g. Baye and Morgan, 2001). 
 
Persuasive Advertising: Comparative Advertising of Product Characteristics 
In many industries with branded consumer goods, the branded good is sold in a 
vertically integrated structure or the manufacturer essentially controls the downstream 
pricing. In these cases it is appropriate not to model any retailers or intermediaries and 
to postulate that manufacturers sell directly to consumers. In such a setting, Aluf and 
Shy (2001) present a duopoly model of persuasive advertising in which advertising by 
one firm reduces the willingness-to-pay for the competitor’s product; this may 
correspond to negative comparative advertising. Advertising is assumed to increase the 
heterogeneity among consumers and thus product differentiation. Consequently, firms 
use “comparative” advertising as a product differentiation strategy, which reduces price 
competition. In a simple model with inelastic demand, welfare consequences are 
captured by the socially wasteful advertising expenditures. 21 
 
In several industries retailers or intermediaries play an essential role in selling a 
manufacturer’s product to consumers. Shaffer and Zettelmeyer (2002) analyze the 
effects of a manufacturer’s advertising campaign on the retailer under the assumption 
that comparative advertising leads to an increase of consumer valuations of the 
advertised product and a decrease of the consumer valuations for the compared product, 
where the advertising campaign can be tailored to mainly affect the valuations of the 
core or non-core consumers of one product. However, a retailer may not necessarily like 
comparative advertising if he carries also the product that would loose market share as a 
consequence of the comparative advertising campaign. If the retailer has market power 
he may refuse to participate in the campaign for the product for which the comparative 
advertising campaign is launched. Shaffer and Zettelmeyer explore the retailer’s 
incentives not to participate in the advertising campaign. They find that participation is 
more likely the larger is the increase in consumers’ valuations of the praised product 
relative to the decrease in their valuations for the product of comparison. They also find 
that the type of targeting of the advertising campaign is crucial in determining whether 
or not a retailer benefits from the manufacturer’s campaign. In particular, a retailer 
always loses from ads that are targeted at the manufacturer’s core consumers and 
always gains from ads that are targeted at the manufacturer’s non-core consumers. The 
intuition is that after a campaign targeted at core consumers both manufacturers enjoy 
                                                          
21 Quite differently, Shy (1992) and (1995, chap. 11) focus on the matching of heterogeneous consumers 
with differentiated brands, where the firms sell the branded goods over time and compete on market 
shares. In his model the two firms can use either non-comparative or comparative advertising. In Shy's 
terms, a non-comparative advertising is persuasive since it is aimed to attract new users. In contrast a 
comparative advertising is informative and is targeted to experienced users: it is used to inform those 
consumers who have already purchased the product before. By assumption, informative advertising 
cannot be misleading. 
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more market power, whereas the reverse holds if the campaign is targeted at non-core 
consumers. 
 
In these papers with persuasive advertising, it is implicitly assumed that comparative 
advertising affects consumers’ valuation differently than non-comparative advertising. 
This reflects the view that consumers can make relative judgments but that they often 
find it hard to interpret information without a reference point. These analyses apply to 
products that are well established so that their qualities are known. Nevertheless, 
advertising changes consumers’ preferences. An alternative view is to see advertising as 
a complement to other product characteristics. Also in this case comparative advertising 
increases the consumers’ valuations of the advertised product and possibly decreases the 
consumers’ valuations of the compared product. As mentioned above, the positive 
analysis under both views coincides. However, welfare consequences are different. For 
a welfare analysis of persuasive advertising see Dixit and Norman (1978). 
 
 
Informative Advertising: Comparative Advertising of Product Characteristics 
In new product markets, consumers often do not know the quality or other product 
characteristics of entering firms. In such cases, comparative advertising may be a useful 
strategy to transmit information to consumers. Advertising in general may be a tool to 
make consumers aware of a certain product (e.g. as modeled in Grossman and Shapiro, 
1984). Comparative advertising can, in addition, establish a product in a certain segment 
of the market. For instance, to compete against an up-market car such as a BMW a car 
manufacturer has to position its own car as being comparable in certain product 
characteristics to cars in the targeted segment. In this case comparative advertising is 
simply directly informative advertising about availability and potentially product 
characteristics. 
 
When the claim in a comparative advertising is easily (ex-post) verifiable and deviations 
from the truth are severely punished, a firm never misleads consumers. As a 
consequence we can assume that comparative claims are truthful and, thus, directly 
informative. Similar to the case with persuasive advertising (as in Aluf and Shy, 2001), 
it is conceivable that also directly informative comparative advertising relaxes price 
competition. Suppose that consumers do not observe the product characteristics and that 
firms may via truthful comparative advertising highlight the superiority of their product 
along certain dimensions. To illustrate this point, we consider a simple symmetric 
setting in which the firms’ products can be positioned either at 0 or 1 and consumers 
have different evaluations for products at these two points. That is, consider a simple 
Hotelling specification of the market. In the linear Hotelling version with disutility 
parameter t a consumer has an expected disutility of t/2 for each product if the 
probability for each configuration 0 or 1 is 1/2. Products of the two firms are ex ante 
identical so that price competition between the two firms is intense. 
 
Consider now the possibility of comparative advertising in which firms can 
communicate the relative position of their products. Suppose that the realization of each 
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product is 0 or 1 with probability ½ each and that draws are independent. Then there is a 
50 percent chance that products are differentiated. In this case it is profitable for firms to 
communicate their difference to consumers as this allows them to relax price 
competition. Hence comparative advertising may be a successful product differentiation 
strategy. The general idea by competition authorities that more information increases 
competition is here violated. The reason is that the relevant information released makes 
products distinguishable from each other, which increases the market power of the firms 
involved. The argument can also be made in a market in which firms have different 
qualities (for a formal analysis of this point see Barigozzi and Peitz, 2004). 
 
One lesson of this paper is that more information in the market can lead to less 
competition. In its 1979 statement the FTC emphasized the opposite possibility, namely 
that more information can lead to more competition. This depends on whether 
information reduces or increases the market power of firms. In Barigozzi and Peitz 
(2004) comparative advertising can be seen as a differentiation strategy. The resulting 
higher price necessarily reduce consumer welfare; they also reduce social welfare, i.e. 
total surplus, if total demand is not perfectly price inelastic. There is, however, a 
countervailing welfare effect: the additional information in the market that is 
transmitted through comparative advertising improves the matching between product 
and buyers. The overall effect of social welfare depends on the degree of price elasticity 
of demand. 
 
When comparative claims are directly informative, firms spends in the advertising 
campaign the minimum amount needed to transmit the desired information to 
consumers. However, when the claim in the ad is difficult to verify, in particular, when 
it contains a quality comparison, it seems important to consider how a manufacturer 
endogenously decides whether to use a truthful comparative claim or not, and how to 
spend for it, given the antitrust law and the way such a law is implemented. 
  
For this consider a simple setup in which manufacturing firms sell directly to 
consumers. In the following setting comparative advertising has two characteristics: it is 
interpreted as a comparison quality claim and it is dissipative. The quality claim is 
verifiable only by a court and the ad transmits information indirectly both trough its cost 
and trough the competitor’s reaction that it eventually induces. 
 
Suppose an established and a new firm operate in a market. Consumers do not know the 
product quality of the new firm, whereas both firms do. The entrant's quality is either 
high (H) or low (L). Producing high quality leads to fixed costs F, producing low 
quality leads to zero fixed costs, while variable costs are zero for both qualities. It is 
commonly known which quality the established firm offers. Without loss of generality, 
it is assumed that this quality is high. Profits of the established firm depend on its own 
quality (always H) and consumer beliefs about the product quality of the new firm qe. 
Given high quality of the established firm its reduced profits are written as ΠI(qe). Given 
the quality of the established firm profits of the new firm depend on its true quality qE 
and its perceived quality qe. Reduced profits are written as ΠE(qe,q). Note in particular 
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that ΠE(qe,H) = ΠE( qe,L) - F. The established firm's profits are decreasing in the 
competitor's perceived quality. In particular, ΠI(L) > ΠI(H). The new firm makes higher 
profits the higher its perceived quality. In particular, ΠE(H,q) > ΠE(L,q). 
  
The two firms interact as follows. At the first stage, the product quality of the new firm 
is exogenously determined (for illustration: the quality is H with probability 1/2, and L 
with probability 1/2). Both firms observe the quality of the new firm, consumers do not. 
At the second stage, the entrant decides among the set of advertising types {c,g,n}, 
namely comparative, generic, or no advertising respectively. Associated costs are Ac, Ag 
and 0, respectively. We assume, for simplicity, that after choosing g or c the advertising 
cost is unavoidable and can only take a given value Ac = Ag = A; this emphasizes that 
technically the two types of advertising differ only in the ''wording'' of the message but 
that the same advertising space has to be bought. At stage 3, provided that the new firm 
has used comparative advertising, the established firm decides whether to go to court, 
paying legal costs C. The court verifies the quality of the new firm and thus whether its 
claim was justified. If it was not justified the new firm has to pay damages D. At the last 
stage, consumers observe the decisions on stages 2 to 3 (including the court verdict) but 
not the realization of quality at stage 1, and update their beliefs concerning the product 
quality of the new firm based on the observed actions in stages 2 and 3. Then they make 
their purchasing decisions. 
  
To have a meaningful analysis, suppose that the new firm gains from generic 
advertising if this makes consumers believe in high quality, ΠE(H,q) – A > ΠE(L,q). 
While this makes generic ads possibly attractive, it also implies that there does not exist 
an equilibrium (to be precise, perfect Bayesian equilibrium) in which the new firm uses 
generic advertising. 
 
This can be seen as follows. At a potential separating equilibrium with generic 
advertising, an entrant firm with low quality type does not use advertising, that is, the 
decision at stage 2 is n, whereas an entrant firm with high quality type chooses generic 
advertising g and forcibly pays A. The separation constraint for the low type is ΠE(L,L) 
≥ ΠE(H,L) – A. For the high type it is ΠE(L,H) ≤ ΠE(H,H) – A. Therefore, a separating 
equilibrium could exist only if the interior of the interval for A given by ΠE(H,L) – 
ΠE(L,L) ≤ A ≤ ΠE(H,H) – ΠE(L,H) was not empty, which is impossible considering that 
the assumption on the cost of quality implies ΠE (qe,H) = ΠE (qe,L) –F. 
  
Does comparative advertising suffer the same fate? Not necessarily. Suppose that using 
comparative advertising (choosing c at stage 2) makes consumers believe in high 
quality unless the court verdict contradicts the advertising claims. The separating 
constraint for a high type entrant is again ΠE(H,H) – A > ΠE(L,H). Suppose furthermore 
that the established firm makes higher profits unmasking its competitor to be of low 
quality and receiving damages than it would make under high quality beliefs, namely 
ΠI(L) – C + D > ΠI(H). When the incumbent reacts to a false claim, the separating 
constraint for an entrant of type L is ΠE(L,L) –A – D ≤ ΠE(L,L), which is trivially 
satisfied. Since ΠI(L) > ΠI(H) holds by assumption, a separating equilibrium with 
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comparative advertising necessarily exists if D > C and for sufficiently low cost of 
advertising, namely for ΠE(H,H) – ΠE(L,H) > A. This is the only possible separating 
perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Note that the damages may even be zero, D = 0, and the 
argument may still hold.  
 
Alternatively, suppose that consumers do not observe the court action but only the 
choice of the advertising type at the second stage. It can be easily show that, 
comparative advertising solves the adverse selection problem verifying the self-
selection constraints if and only if D > C.  
 
From the analysis above follow a number of observations. First, comparative 
advertising may be an effective way to transmit information to consumers under 
circumstances under which generic advertising cannot serve as a signal of product 
quality. Second, the amount of damages needed to punish deceptive advertising depends 
on the speed of information acquisition by consumers. In the extreme case, where the 
court’s verdict is observed before any purchases have occurred no damages may need to 
be awarded. In the other extreme case, where neither the incumbents reaction nor the 
court’s verdict is observed by consumers, at least the direct and indirect legal costs of 
the incumbent have to be paid back by the entrant to provide the right incentives to the 
incumbent to sue in case of deceptive advertising. 
  
The general idea behind the example is that comparative advertising triggers strategic 
interaction between informed parties. This interaction allows the uniformed party 
(consumers) to infer about the realization of an unobservable variable (product quality). 
There are two channels through which the incumbent's strategy may help the entrant. 
First, the choice of comparative advertising is interpreted by consumers as a stronger 
signal than generic because it would lead to legal action and payment of damages in 
case of cheating. Further, the observation of the informed incumbent not reacting to 
comparative claims is interpretable as good news about the entrant's quality. As stated 
above, the first channel may operate with or without the second.  
 
Barigozzi, Garella, and Peitz (2003) provide a detailed analysis of a much richer model. 
Here firms receive a noisy signal about the entrant’s product quality. In their model it 
depends on the parameter constellation whether comparative or generic advertising is 
the preferred signal. In particular, comparative advertising is likely to be used in 
markets in which firms receive precise information about product quality whereas in 
markets with imprecise information an entrant firm may be discouraged from making 
comparative claims because with some positive probability, they will turn out to be 
false provided the incumbent goes to court. Then, if damages are sufficiently high, the 
incumbent has indeed an incentive to challenge any comparative claim. In effect the 
entrant may opt for generic advertising that avoids the challenge. 
 
This extended model also allows to distinguish between erroneous claims according to 
which the entrant acted in good faith and malicious falsehood. In the latter case, the 
entrant is perfectly aware that its quality claim lacks any substance. In equilibrium, the 
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entrant makes erroneous claims but malicious falsehood can be wiped out. Note that in 
practice, US courts award higher damages in case of malicious falsehood. This suggests 
that judges are aware of the importance to separate erroneous claims from malicious 
falsehood. To do so they have to consider the intent of a firm. A harsh punishment of 
erroneous claims would lead to a higher risk using comparative advertising. This may 
then lead to less information in the market or to information transmission at a higher 
social cost as in the case of generic advertising. In the present context this is often not 
desirable from a social point of view (see below). If on the other hand malicious 
falsehood can be proven the court should punish such behavior. 
 
In a more general setting, also the issue of price signaling arises. The classic treatments 
of advertising as a signal are within a monopoly set-up (e.g. Milgrom and Roberts, 
1986; for an overview see Bagwell, 2003). Barigozzi, Garella, and Peitz (2004) show 
that a new firm will use advertising as a signal of quality when competing against an 
established firm together with price. Since comparative advertising reduces the amount 
of advertising expenses needed to separate, there is still a role for comparative 
advertising when prices are viable signals as well. 
 
Since dissipative advertising expenditures have a welfare reduction as its direct effect, 
lower expenditures are, all else being equal, welfare-enhancing. Hence the direct effect 
of comparative compared to generic advertising is positive. If in the market equilibrium 
the threat to sue the sponsoring firm is never carried out, then the possibility to go to 
court only disciplines a firm that might want to make false claims. In effect, the 
signaling cost of advertising is lower and welfare is improved. However, if the precision 
of the information available to the sponsoring brand is imperfect, the sponsoring firm 
may run a comparative advertising campaign in the belief that its claims are truthful 
whereas effectively they are not. Then two situations can arise depending on the 
information of the competitor. First, if both firms have access to the same information, 
the competitor may sue regardless of the information it possesses given that there is 
always some chance that the court will rule the advertising claim to be wrong. If this is 
sufficiently likely and the competitor’s benefit associated to go to court are sufficiently 
high (through damages and the indirect effect of information revelation to consumers), 
it is clearly in the interest of the competitor to take this action. Second, if the competitor 
has access to different sources of information than the sponsoring firm and if this 
information tells that the claim is false, it will go to court even if the benefit associated 
to this action is modest. In these cases, litigation is not only costly for the parties 
involved but often adds a social cost if the cost generated by the case on the court 
system is not fully covered by the two involved parties, the sponsoring firm and its 
competitor. This negative effect on social welfare has to be taken into account. On the 
positive side, the court generates possibly new information that consumers may use 
when making their purchase decision. 
 
It is interesting to notice that the signaling role of dissipative advertising is of particular 
importance in the case of experience and credence goods. For such goods quality claims 
are not verifiable to the consumer. In the case of experience goods, a consumer must 
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consume these goods before knowing if the product characteristics fit her taste. 
Dissipative advertising has a positive effect in that it may allow high quality firms to 
transmit some information to consumers about their product characteristics, in particular 
if there are repeat purchases. Comparative advertising can have the same positive effect, 
but at a lower cost to the advertising firm.  
 
Information asymmetry between experts and consumers is higher in the case of 
credence goods. For such goods consumers cannot learn quality after consumption. As 
we explained in section 2, professionals argue that (comparative) advertising must be 
forbidden in the consumers’ interest. In fact in their opinion consumers find it difficult 
to assess information about professional services and therefore need particular 
protection from misleading or manipulative claims. It is true that generic dissipative 
advertising cannot be, in this case, a channel of indirectly transmitting information 
because information is not ex-post verifiable. Anyway, the second channel of indirect 
information, that is, the exposition to the competitor’s reaction is still present with 
credence goods, provided that also competitors and the courts can become experts. This 
may enable a firm to transmit some information to consumers. Hence, we have provided 
a theoretical argument in support of the use of comparative advertising for professional 
services. 
 
4. Analysis of Selected Antitrust Cases 
 
Allegedly misleading comparative advertising 
Several European and US cases have as a critical issue whether the comparison ad is 
indeed misleading. In the UK as well as in the US case law has evolved which provide 
interpretations of the law and thus additional guidance. As we mentioned in section 2, in 
the UK section 10(6) of the 1994 Trademark Act is relevant for the case analysis of 
comparative advertising. According to section 10(6) the use of a registered mark does 
not constitute copyright infringement if it is in accordance with honest practices in 
industrial and commercial matters. The term “honest practices in industrial and 
commercial matters” can be criticized as vague. It may be interpreted by bodies that 
regulate advertising. However, in Barclays Bank Plc v RBS Advanta [1996] RPC 307 
the court did not consider the suggestion to follow statutory or agreed codes of conduct.  
Barclays Bank Plc v RBS Advanta concerned advertising by RBS Advanta.22 It 
compared the terms of the advertiser's own credit cards with those of competing credit 
cards including the Barclaycard Standard Visa.  A leaflet listed 15 dimensions 
summarized by the statement that the RBS Advanta card was said to be 'a better credit 
card all round'.  In addition, a brochure included a comparative table showing the main 
financial terms of competitive credit cards. 
The plaintiff Barklay’s Bank argued that the leaflet was not honest as it did not compare 
like with like.  In particular, it was selective because it did not mention other ancillary 
                                                          
22 Our presentation of this case follows Swan (2000). 
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benefits which Barklay’s Bank offered to its cardholders and which RBS Advanta did 
not. Examples are a 24 hour emergency service and an overseas emergency service.  
Furthermore, 6 or 7 out of the 15 points listed in the RBS Advanta leaflet were common 
to Barclaycard as well.  
Judge Laddie J was not convinced and concluded that the defendant really believed to 
offer customers a better deal, summarized by the advertisements with the list of 15 
items.  He argued that honesty had to be judged by what can be reasonably expected by 
the relevant public exposed to the advertisements. 
Subsequent decisions have made it clear that the use of a competitive trade mark is 
acceptable if it is honest.  In the words of Laddie J, an advertisement may be dishonest 
if it is “significantly misleading”. 
The general principles have been summarized by judge Jacob J in Cable & Wireless 
PLC v. British Telecommunications PLC [1998] FSR 383:23 “The primary objective of 
s.10(6) of the 1994 Act is to permit comparative advertising.  
1. As long as the use of a competitor's mark is honest, there is nothing wrong in 
telling the public of the relative merits of competing goods or services and using 
registered trade marks to identify them.  
2. The onus is on the registered proprietor to show that the factors indicated in the 
proviso to s10(6) exist.  
3. There will be no trade mark infringement unless the use of the registered mark is 
not in accordance with honest practices.  
4. The test is objective: would a reasonable reader be likely to say, upon being 
given the full facts, that the advertisement is not honest?  
5. Statutory or industry agreed codes of conduct are not a helpful guide as to 
whether an advertisement is honest for the purposes of s. 10(6).  Honesty has to 
be gauged against what is reasonably to be expected by the relevant public of 
advertisements for the goods or services in issue.  
6. It should be borne in mind that the general public are used to the ways of 
advertisers and expects hyperbole.  
7. The 1994 Act does not impose on the courts an obligation to try and enforce 
through the back door of trade mark legislation a more puritanical standard than 
the general public would expect from advertising copy.  
8. An advertisement which is significantly misleading is not honest for the 
purposes of s. 10(6).  
9. The advertisement must be considered as a whole.  
10. As a purpose of the 1994 Act is positively to permit comparative advertising, the 
court should not hold words used in the advertisement to be seriously misleading 
                                                          
23 These were established by established in Barclays Bank v. RBS Adanta and the subsequent case of 
Vodafone Group plc v Orange Personal Communications Services Ltd [1997] FSR 34. Jacob J built on 
M. Crystal QC in British Telecommunications Plc v AT & T Communications (UK) Ltd (unreported) 18 
December 1996. 
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for interlocutory purposes unless on a fair reading of them in their context and 
against the background of the advertisement as a whole they can really be said to 
justify that description.  
11. A minute textual examination is not something upon which the reasonable 
reader of an advertisement would embark. 
12. The court should therefore not encourage a microscopic approach to the 
construction of a comparative advertisement on a motion for interlocutory 
relief.”  
This view has been restated in British Airways plc v Ryanair Limited [2000] which 
contrasts nicely with a court’s view of an advertising campaign by Ryanair in Belgium. 
We first consider the case in Britain before turning to the case in Belgium. 
 
In 1999 Ryanair ran a comparative advertising campaign in various newspapers in the 
UK. First, it placed the so-called "Bastard" advertisement (with the headline 
"EXPENSIVE BA…DS!), later the so-called "Expensive" advertisement (with the 
headline "EXPENSIVE BA").  I reproduce them as an annex to this judgment.    The 
Bastard advertisement appeared in February and March in several national newparpers 
the Expensive advertisement appeared just once in November, in the Evening Standard.  
Before the latter the Advertising Standards Authority had upheld a complaint by 
members of the public (not made by BA) against the Bastard advertisement.  It 
considered that the headline "was likely to cause serious or widespread offence."  
Ryanair responded that it would not use the headline again. The court then only had to 
decide how costs of the two sides were to be allocated; both sides made the case on a 
matter of high principle. 
 
In British Airways plc v. Ryanair Limited, 8 December 2000, the judge gave a general 
evaluation about what constitutes misleading advertising. He comments on the 
testimonies as follows. “For Ryanair the principal witness was Mr Jeans, its Sales and 
Marketing Director. … he wanted dramatically to convey the message that Ryanair was 
a lot cheaper than BA for what was broadly the same journey. In part the effect of that 
would be to take sales from BA, in part it would generate new sales from those who 
could not afford BA prices. In relation to the Bastards advertisement Mr Hobbs [for the 
plaintiff] sought to demonstrate that Ryanair selected the headline first and put in the 
price comparisons later as some sort of spurious justification for the headline. Actually 
the facts were that the advertising agency had been asked to produce a number of 
headlines (which they did somewhat sequentially). All of these were intended to go with 
a price comparison table - of the same sort as Ryanair had used previously. The fact that 
the detailed BA prices were only obtained at the last minute has no sinister significance 
- that would have happened whatever the headline chosen. The point of the last minute 
obtaining of detailed prices was to avoid the risk of any change happening before 
publication. It was done to ensure accuracy.” (British Airways plc v. Ryanair Limited, 8 
December 2000). The judge continues: “Before passing from the witnesses, it is 
particularly pertinent to observe that no witness testified to anyone actually being 
misled by either advertisement. There have been no complaints about deceptiveness in 
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respect of any of the matters alleged made by members of the public (to whom the 
advertisements were directed) or even by anyone independent in the trade. Complaints 
might have been made to either party, to the ASA or to any Trading Standards Officer 
in any Local Authority.” 
 
BA had three complaints: (1) it found the Bastard headline offensive; (2) it said that the 
individual price comparisons were unfair; (3) and it said that in the case of Frankfurt 
and Dinard the destination comparisons were unfair. With respect to the headling 
Ryanair promised not to repeat it. Ryanair considered both the price comparison and the 
destination comparison to be fair. In the two latter points the judge agreed with Ryanair. 
 
In the advertisements Raynair mentions only one price for BA and one for Ryanair for 
certain city-pairs. At that point BA operated like other “flag” or “conventional” airlines 
under the so-called “Saturday night rule”, according to which to fly out on a weekday 
and fly back before the weekend, costs a lot more then taking a return-trip which 
includes a Saturday night. For example, in the BA’s return same week fare from 
London to Frankfurt was, as quoted in the Bastard advertisement, £374; including 
Saturday night, the return fare would be £192. In its price comparison Ryanair noted 
that prices refer to “Midweek return fees”, where Ryanair required a minimum of two 
nights stay on its flights. Although this term is to some extent ambiguous, the judge 
argued that “what matters is the phrase read in the context of the advertisement - by 
people familiar with the Saturday night rule.  My conclusion is that most people would 
have appreciated that what was being got at was the resented rule.” Furthermore, the 
judge reasoned as follows: “I think people would take the advertisement to be making 
the most favourable comparison Ryanair could reasonably make - that is what 
advertisers are most apt to do.  The average consumer would know BA was cheaper if 
one stayed over Saturday.  So, he would realise that it was same week returns that were 
being compared.” This is in line with earlier cases according to which the consumers 
have an understanding of the way advertisers make their messages. In the words of 
Jacob J, “I do not think that the average consumer would find the price comparison 
misleading.  He would expect there to be some sort of conditions (and indeed the small 
print makes that clear).  In substance the advertisements were true.” 
 
With respect to destinations, there were two points. The first relates to Frankfurt.  
Ryanair fly to the “secondary” airport Frankfurt-Hahn which is designated by IATA as 
a city airport of Frankfurt but is about 68 miles from the city centre whereas Frankfurt 
International is only around 6 miles from the city center.  BA correctly said that the 
advertisement did not make this clear, which was true.  However Judge Jacob J did not 
consider this to be an unfair comparison.24 The second point relates to Dinard and was 
rather bizarre since a flight with  BA would require to change planes.  Hence, the ad 
compares the fares but does not point out that the BA fare is for a journey which suffers 
                                                          
24 Interestingly, a German court required Ryanair to state that its airport is Frankfurt-Hahn not Frankfurt 
in its comparative ads comparing its prices to those of Lufthansa. The naïve observer might conclude that 
British consumers must be better informed about the airlines’ use of German airports than German 
consumers. 
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the additional disadvantage of having to change planes.  This clearly does not make the 
advertisement by Ryanair dishonest, as argued by Jacob J. 
 
Ryanair also ran advertising campaigns in continental Europe comparing its flights with 
those of flag carriers. Perhaps the most illuminating case is the one in Belgian, a country 
which traditionally has been hostile to comparative advertising. On 24 April 2001 
advertisements with the text "Welcome Ryanair and its lowest fares. Goodbye Sabena 
and its outrageously expensive flights" appeared in 6 national Belgian newspapers and 
on publicity vehicles in Brussels. On the same day Sabena asked Ryanair to withdraw 
the ads. Ryanair ignored this request and on the following day released an ad with a 
picture of the Brussels landmark the "Mannequin Pis", a statue of a boy urinating, with 
the line " Pissed off with Sabena's high fares? Low fares have arrived in Belgium". 
Ryanair also published price comparisons indicating the vast difference between the two 
airlines' one-way fares. Sabena’s president and CEO reacted by calling the ads “clearly 
defamatory”. Raynair’s CEO O'Leary faxed back that the ads were "valid criticisms of 
Sabena's outrageously high air fares" and, hoping for free publicity, distributed it to 
every major Belgian newspaper. 
 
Sabena then took the case to court and claimed that the ads violated Belgian 
comparative advertising legislation and were unlawful because (1) the ads were 
misleading; (2) the text was denigrating and damaging to Sabena’s reputation (3) 
Ryanair obtained unfair advantage through the use of Sabena’s logo and trademark. The 
claim that the ads were misleading were based on the fact that Sabena offered services 
to many destinations whereas Ryanair offered flights to only four countries in Europe, 
at the time the ads were placed. Also, no comparisons of “relevant characteristics” were 
made. In particular, Sabena claimed that consumers could not objectively judge the 
services of Sabena and Ryanair based on the terms “lowest” or “outrageously 
expensive”. 
 
Ryanair defended its campaign as in the case against British Airways. It argued that the 
ads were not misleading. By launching its service to Brussels-Charleroi, Ryanair 
claimed that it had shown that lower air fares were possible. It also claimed that 
consumers had benefited overall as Sabena reduced its fares on routes where it was in 
competition with Ryanair. 
 
Judge J M Lahaye (in a judgment of the Brussels Commercial Court published 
on 10 July 2001) upheld Sabena's complaint. He found that Ryanair's advertising 
campaign was misleading and offensive and damaged Sabena's reputation. He ruled that 
any future comparative ads by Ryanair should include details of prices and comparisons 
of the quality of service. Ryanair was ordered to discontinue the ads immediately and to 
run corrective ads: he ordered Ryanair to publish an an extract of the decision in 
Belgian newspapers and post it on its website for a period of three weeks. The court 
further imposed a penalty of 99,000 Euros for every future breach of the order.25 
                                                          
25 Ryanair paced ads with an apology in Belgian newspapers. "We're Sooooo Sorry Sabena!" said the 
advert, which went on to list seven one-way price comparisons, maintaining that Ryanair is up to 89% 
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Both of these campaigns tried to establish RyanAir as a low-cost alternative to national 
“flag” carriers, BA in the UK and Sabena in Belgium. They show different attitudes of 
the courts within Europe. As mentioned in Section 2 Belgium has in the past (before the 
EU Directive became effective) taken a hostile stand towards comparative advertising, 
whereas comparative advertising has been seen more relaxed in the UK since the TMA 
of 1994. Even after the EU Directive was passed, the Belgian and UK court rulings 
suggest a difference in approaches.26  
 
The fact that Belgium did not allow comparative advertising until recently and that its 
court appeared to be tougher on RyanAir allows for a number of alternative 
interpretations. Belgian courts may still be more hostile to comparative advertising 
because of legal history. Alternatively, in Belgium law makers and judges alike may 
have a more parternalistic vision according to which there are consumers who suffer 
from severe misperceptions and therefore have to be protected. In such a world, 
comparative advertising would need to adhere to the strictest standards. Perhaps the 
most favorable view is that at least initially the Belgian court feels it has to protect 
consumers from ads like the one by Ryanair because consumers lack the experience to 
see the ad in the same context as e.g. British consumers would do. 
 
While the Belgian case highlights the high hurdle for comparative advertising in parts of 
continental Europe, standards for “honest” comparative advertising appear to be lower 
in other places. 
 
This can be illustrated by a recent US Lanham Act case. In Avon Products v. S.C. 
Johnson & Son (1994)27 the court refused to prohibit the comparative advertising for the 
insect repellent Off by Johnson. The ad stated that Off was better than Avon’s Skin-So-
Soft, a bath oil frequently used as insect repellent. Avon called Johnson’s ads “illegal 
efforts to confuse consumers, tarnish Avon's reputation, and gain sales at Avon's 
expense.” In particular, Avon claimed that the ad would confuse consumers because 
Avon had a new insect repellent. With the suit Avon tried to make Johnson stop the 
advertisements, issue corrective advertising, and provide monetary damages. The court 
was not troubled by Johnson’s advertising campaign.28 
                                                                                                                                                                          
cheaper. The ad concluded: "Ryanair is really, really sorry and promises to include this information in our 
future advertising." At the end of 2001 Sabena ceased to exist. 
26 RyanAir had more success against Alitalia in Italy than against Sabena in Belgium. In 2002 a ruling by 
Italy’s Competition Authority rejected a complaint by Alitalia about Ryanair’s comparative campaign. 
Ryanair’s chief executive O’Leary commented: “Alitalia attacked Ryanair’s comparative advertising 
precisely because it is true - and the Authority now confirmed it. The decision guarantees that Ryanair 
can continue to demonstrate the extent to which Alitalia is overcharging Italian consumers” (cited in The 
Daily Mirror, London; Sep 13, 2002). 
27 Avon Products, Inc. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. (1994), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7950, 94 Civ. 3958 
(AGS) (S.D.N.Y. June 15) 
28 The only exception is that the court prohibited a footnote in the ad that contained the false claim that 
the competitor’s product Skin-So-Soft was not registered with the Environmental Protection Agency as an 
insect repellent. 
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In this case (as in several others) the comparison is rather ambiguous. Under the 
Lanham Act the plaintiff faces a high burden of proof. He has to show that consumers 
were likely to be misled by the ad. To do so, the plaintiff has to prove the actual 
messages that the ad communicates to consumers. 
 
The courts in the US distinguish between establishment (or tests prove) claims and non-
establishment claims. In cases with non-establishment claims the plaintiff has to prove 
that the advertising is false. This is clearly a higher burden of proof than for case with 
establishment claims where plaintiff must only prove that the supporting tests are 
inadequate. 
 
Superiority or Puffery 
Our next two cases go one step further. In those cases it is not obvious whether the ad 
merely contains puffery or whether the claim can transmit some information to 
consumers. 
 
In 2000 a federal judge ruled that Papa John's must pay over $468,000 in damages to 
Pizza Hut and cease and desist from using its tag line "Better ingredients. Better pizza." 
The judge ruled in favor of Pizza Hut, as the ingredient comparison was misleading. In 
fact the claim cannot be scientifically substantiated nor taste tests exist that prove a 
statistically significant preference for Papa John's product. Notice that a claim would be 
a generalized statement of opinion, hence puffery, notwithstanding the clear implication 
that the advertiser’s pizzas were better than others because of the better ingredients. 
However, in the context of two commercials that focused on the advertiser’s 
ingredients, the court agreed that the slogan was an implied, unsubstantiated superiority 
claim with the characteristics of a statement of fact. However, the 5th US Circuit Court 
of Appeals overturned the verdict. The court argued that Pizza Hut failed to present 
evidence that a reasonable consumer was influenced in her purchasing decision, that is, 
the plaintiff failed to show implied falsity. (In 2001, the US Supreme Court refused to 
review the decision.) 
 
A recent case in a Dutch court suggests that comparative advertising with questionable 
superiority claims may survive European courts. In April 2004 a civil court in Utrecht, 
Netherlands, has ruled on a case concerning razor manufacturers Gillette and 
Wilkinson. The court decided that both can claim that their most recent bladed razors 
are the best. Gillette launched a complaint before the court because Wilkinson had 
advertised its new 4 bladed razor saying that it produces the smoothest result and that it 
had carried out comparative tests, showing that it was even better than Gillette's 3-
bladed one. Gillette sued Wilkinson claiming that this was misleading advertising. 
Wilkinson filed a counter suit, saying that also Gillette made superiority claims in its 
advertising, without being able to substantiate these claims. The court rejected Gillette's 
case arguing that the advertising was not misleading. It also rejected Wilkinson's case 
because Gillette simply used classic advertising exaggerations, which could not be seen 
as misleading. The court argued that consumers would not believe the ads anyway. 
 30
Hence both firms can continue to claim that they are better than their competitor (for 
more information see BBC news, 23 April, 2004). 
 
For the advertising not to be misleading, consumers must be either rather sophisticated 
or, since advertisers can exaggerate and use hyperbole, mostly ignore content. In the 
latter case there is hardly any possibility of a more efficient information transmission 
with comparative claims than with generic advertising. If consumers are not able to 
separate advertising which exaggerate to those which do not, firms have an incentive to 
exaggerate whenever they can get away with it. Although consumers can be expected to 
learn about the courts’ stand on comparative advertising, by allowing exaggerations and 
hyperbole the courts may have made it more difficult to convey information for those 
advertisers who otherwise would have provided truthful content statements. This may 
lead to socially wasteful advertising and ultimately less information in the market. 
Therefore, the courts must distinguish very carefully between those cases in which the 
ad contains puffery which is easily recognized as such by the average consumer and 
other cases in which claims are potentially informative but the content is exaggerated. In 
the latter case, we would argue that courts apply strict test so as to make truthful non-
exaggerated claims possible. 
 
A case in point is S.C. Johnson v. The Corox Co., 241 F.3d 232 (2nd Cir. 2001). In this 
case, Clorox, the maker of Glad-Lock storage bags, ran television that featured a 
comparative ad of Glad storage bags versus Ziploc storage bags. Both of them were 
filled with water and turned upside down. In the advertisement the Glad-Lock bags 
stayed watertight while the Ziploc bags leaked profusely. An animated goldfishin in the 
Ziploc bag was shown in a state of distress. To prove that the ads were misleading, S.C. 
Johnson simply proved that their bags leaked at a slower speed than the rate represented 
by the advertisement. The court concluded that the content of the ads was literally false 
and the ads were found in violations of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.29  
 
Damages 
In our last case we consider damages. The most famous case of punitive damages in the 
US is the U-Haul International Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d 1034 (9th Cir. 1986). The 
court found Jartran of wilful and malicious false advertising after running a comparative 
advertising campaign run for more than a year. As the basis of the $40 million 
judgement served  $6,4 million to cover the cost of the false advertising campaign and 
$13,6 million to air corrective advertising. Under Section 35 of the Lanham Act, the 
court doubled the award to a total of $40 million. (see e.g. Bixby and Lincoln, 1989, or 
Steinberg and Naidech, 2003). In this case awarding the defendant’s profit was justified 
to avoid the defendant’s unjust enrichment, as first established by the 2d Circuit in 1984 
for a case of false advertising (see Raymond, 2004).30 
 
                                                          
29 Compared to the Pizza Hut case, this illustrates that literal falsity can be a more successful strategy for 
the plaintiff (see also section 2). 
30 Burndy Corp., v. Teledyne Industries Inc., 748 F.2d Cir. 1984. 
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Damages in form of corrective advertising may be needed to re-establish the lost or 
damaged reputation of a firm. Furthermore, damages in form of attorney’s fees are 
appropriate to give the plaintiff a sufficiently strong incentive to sue against 
comparative advertising which the plaintiff thinks to be misleading. Often, incentives to 
sue are sufficiently strong even in absence of such awarded damages (see Barigozzi, 
Garella, and Peitz, 2003). Also, for a campaign that has already generated revenues, lost 
profits may have to be rewarded to the competitor in case of false or misleading 
advertising. The corresponding incentives are amplified under punitive damages. In all 
cases of damages it seems important to distinguish between erroneous and malicious 
false claims. This allows firms that believe in their product to go ahead with their 
campaign even if to their surprise the claims prove to be erroneous (see our previous 
discussion in section 3). 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Antitrust authorities encourage the use of comparative advertising because, if fair and 
not misleading, it conveys useful information to consumers and can increase 
competition in the market place. The way advertising affects consumers’ behaviour is a 
on-going topic in the economics and marketing literature. In this paper we have 
concentrated on the interpretations of advertising proposed by economists and their 
application to comparative advertising. 
 
The aspect of comparative advertising most relevant for antitrust authorities is its role in 
transmitting information to consumers. This is related to the important issue of how 
information can be transmitted by an “interested party” to another economic agent and 
rises the problem of credibility. There is an important difference between content-free 
generic advertising and comparative advertising: the latter contains a “superiority 
claim” which potentially induces the reaction of the competing firms. Competitors 
(implicitly or explicitly) mentioned in the ad decide whether to challenge the superiority 
claim by engaging in a lawsuit. 
  
When a claim in a comparative ad is easily verifiable and deviation from the truth are 
severely punished, an advertising firm never misleads consumers. In this case we can 
argue that comparative claims are truthful and comparative advertising is directly 
informative. Under directly informative advertising Barigozzi, and Peitz (2004) show 
that comparative claims can become a differentiation strategy. In fact they can be used 
by competing firms to credibly highlight the superiority of their product along certain 
dimensions such to relax price competition. Hence, contrary to what competitions 
authorities seem to believe, it is possible that more information, as provided by 
comparative advertising, increases the market power of firms, instead of reducing it. 
  
When the claim in the ad is difficult to verify, advertising firms endogenously decide 
whether to use truthful or false statements. In this case and as showed in Barigozzi, 
Garella and Peitz (2003), together with the cost of the advertising campaign, the 
potential reaction of the competitor can provide an efficient channel to indirectly 
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transmit information to consumers. In fact, when running a false advertising campaign, 
the firm will be prosecuted and condemned. This represents a mimicking cost and 
slacks the incentive constraint for the advertising firm. Thus, by using (dissipative) 
comparative advertising, signalling can be obtained at a lower cost. The signalling role 
of comparative advertising is particularly important when the advertising claim in based 
on quality characteristics that consumers cannot verify before they purchase the good. 
Thus, comparative quality claims can be indirectly informative for consumers if false 
ads are punished, that is if the legal system works properly. 
 
From Barigozzi, Garella and Peitz (2003) a second interesting lesson can be drawn: 
competition policies, antitrust laws and their implementation are essential in making a 
comparative advertising campaign credible. This is important because only if claims are 
credible, comparative advertising can convey some useful information to consumers. In 
other words, comparative ads can increase competition among firms and retailers only if 
claims are credible and claims are credible only if the legal system is efficient in 
processing false claims. If firms diffusing misleading ads are not punished, all claims 
become empty: comparative claims which are defined non actionable “mere puffery” 
becomes equivalent to generic ad and are not informative. 
 
The way consumers interpret advertising is important for the court, as “implying falsity” 
claims prove. But, at the same time, consumers’ perception is influenced by the legal 
practice, that is consumers learn to interpret comparative claim observing the outcome 
of existing litigations. In this sense legal practice deeply affects the way comparative 
advertising is used by firms and understood by consumers. Thus, a more restrictive legal 
attitude towards comparative claim, as we find in Europe can perhaps better improve 
competition than in the US because it contributes more to the credibility of comparative 
advertising. However, if consumers are sophisticated enough such that they distinguish 
between comparative advertising containing puffery, which cannot be sanctioned, and 
other comparative advertising claims, which can be sanctioned, also the legal attitude in 
the US does not interfere with the flow of information from firms to consumers. 
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